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Abstract—The term gestalt, when used in the context of gen-
eral systems theory, assumes the value of “systemic touchstone”,
namely a ﬁgure of reference used to categorize the properties or
qualities of a set of systems. Typical gestalts used in biology are
those based on anatomical or physiological characteristics, which
correspond respectively to architectural and organizational design
choices in natural and artiﬁcial systems. In this paper we discuss
three gestalts of general systems theory: behavior, organization,
and substance, which refer respectively to the works of Wiener,
Boulding, and Leibniz. Our major focus here is the system
introduced by the latter. Through a discussion of some of the
elements of the Leibnitian System, and by means of several novel
interpretations of those elements in terms of today’s computer
science, we highlight the debt that contemporary research still
has with this Giant among the giant scholars of the past.
I. INTRODUCTION
General Systems Theory [...] hopes to develop
something like a “spectrum” of theories—a system of
systems which may perform the function of a “gestalt”
in theoretical construction. Such “gestalts” in special
ﬁelds have been of great value in directing research
towards the gaps which they reveal.
General Systems Theory—The Skeleton of Science
K. BOULDING
The notion of a General Systems Theory is no recent
invention. Already Aristotle proposed a tentative classiﬁcation
of “systems”. A common aspect between Aristotle’s and all
the classiﬁcations that followed is the use of one or more
systemic touchstones, namely privileged aspects that provide
the classiﬁer with “scales” to diversify systems along one
or more dimensions. A common term used to refer to such
touchstones is gestalt1 [2].
Not only the Great One started the discussion, but he
also set most of its subsequent “rules” by classifying systems
according to several anatomical (that is, architectural) and
physiological (organizational) gestalts. Remarkably enough,
Aristotle realized that a discussion purely based on the above
aspects would not be complete, and suggested to make use
as gestalts also of behavior, purpose, and teleology—the very
same touchstones at the core of the renowned article [3] by
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow. He was also the ﬁrst to put
the accent on social behaviors by writing about mutualistic
relationships between individuals [4]. This second type of
gestalts put their privileged focus on the characteristics and
the quality of the emerging products of systems rather than
1German: “Essence or shape of an entity’s complete form” [1].
on their structural, i.e., constitutive, peculiarities; thus on
dynamic aspects rather than on static design choices. Quality
in particular is expressed as the result of a match with a
deployment environment, which in turn may be assumed to
be static or vary with time.
As postulates in a geometry or the axioms in a conceptual
system, gestalts deﬁne the way we address a given problem and
set the boundaries of what we can prove in it. Furthermore, as
already mentioned, they have “great value in directing research
towards the gaps which they reveal” [2].
The present contribution exempliﬁes three well-known
general systems theories: the behavioral system of Wiener et
al. [3] (Sect. II); the behavioral-organizational categorization
of Boulding [2] (Sect. III); and, in Sect. IV, the system of
Leibniz, based on the behavioral-architectural-organizational
gestalt he refers to as “substance”. In each section we brieﬂy
discuss the system classiﬁcations stemming from the adopted
gestalt and highlight the research directions that they revealed.
In particular in Sect. IV we provide a number of modern-
day interpretations of the major concepts in the philosophy of
Leibniz.
Our conclusions are drawn in Sect. V, where we highlight
how the system of Leibniz anticipated several of the research
directions that emerged with the birth of the computer era,
to the point that modern computer science time and again
provides a useful interpretation of the concepts found in
Leibniz’s philosophy. In particular, we reﬂect on recent results
such as the ones in companion paper [6] and point out our
personal debt with the Leibnitian System.
II. BEHAVIOR
In their renowned paper [3] Rosenblueth, Wiener, and
Bigelow introduce the concept of the “behavioristic study of
natural events” and propose a classiﬁcation of systems that
focuses on the “change produced in the surroundings by the
object”—namely the system’s behavior.
The Authors’ starting point is given by the classes of
passive and active behavior. They describe passive behavior as
the one in which “the object is not a source of energy; all the
energy in the output can be traced to the immediate input (e.g.,
the throwing of an object)”. All behavior that is not passive is
active, namely behavior in which “the object is the source of
the output energy involved in a given [change]”. The class of
active behavior can be reﬁned into two subclasses: purposeful
or non-purposeful active behavior. The ﬁrst subclass identiﬁes
systems that aim at achieving some goal, while the second onecharacterizes “random” behaviors—behaviors that is exercised
by systems that are a source of change but whose action does
not serve an apparent purpose. In the latter category we may
have for instance a source of radiations.
The class of purposeful behavior is then decomposed
into two other subclasses: teleological and non-teleological
behavior, the ﬁrst being characterized by the presence of a
feedback loop by means of which the system can continuously
adjust its action with respect to the intended purpose. Non-
teleological behavior is the one in which said feedback loop
is absent.
In the companion paper [6], systems capable of teleological
behavior have been described as reactive systems. Obviously
as a prerequisite of reactiveness those systems are open [7]
(namely able to perceive, communicate, and interact with
external systems and the environment.)
Finally, the Authors differentiate teleological behavior into
yet another couple of sub-classes: extrapolatory and non-
extrapolatory behaviors. In the former case the system is capa-
ble of advanced apperception, which we deﬁned in [8] as “the
ability to construct theories about the current and related past
situations with which to drive system evolution”. In practice
extrapolatory behaviors are those in which the feedback loop
is governed by the hypothesized future state of the goal—
for instance, its position. Moreover, in extrapolatory behaviors
the hypothesis is drawn on the basis of one or more context
ﬁgures. Extrapolatory systems are thus not merely able to
perceive the environment they are deployed in—they are also
able to store in some form the perception data; continuously
correlate past and new data; create a model to predict the
future state; and use that model to steer the action of their
feedback loop. Extrapolatory behavior is thus proactive [6]
and corresponds to the so-called MAPE-K loop-systems of
autonomic computing [9]. The Authors call the number of
context ﬁgures used in the predictive model “the order” of the
behavior, which constitutes a ﬁnal sub-classiﬁcation in their
treatise.
A. Conclusions
As observed by the Authors, a major consequence of the
behavioristic approach is given by the fact that it does “omit the
speciﬁc structure and the intrinsic organization” of the systems
under scrutiny and only focuses on the action produced by
the system. The model proposed by Wiener et al. thus does
not concern itself with the nature of the system or its design:
in fact it may be applied to any “object” (the Authors’ term
for “system”), be it natural or artiﬁcial, hardware or software,
individual or collective, or any mixture thereof. The only
important ﬁgure in their discussion is the observed behavior,
namely “the examination of the output of the object and of the
relations of this output to the input.”
The behavioral gestalt, for the ﬁrst time applied also to
artiﬁcial entities, provides researcher with a powerful tool to
reason about the quality of systems anticipating in particu-
lar results such as autonomic computing, dependability, and
resilience. The signiﬁcance of the work of Wiener in the
21st Century may be also exempliﬁed through recent works
as the companion paper [6], which proposes a behavioral
interpretation of the concept of system-environment ﬁt and
suggests its use to let systems manage their own resilience
provisions.
III. ORGANIZATION
A similar approach to Wiener’s is followed by Kenneth
Boulding, who in addition to behavioral features also focuses
his attention to the organizational characteristics of systems
both natural and artiﬁcial [2]. Boulding suggests an “arrange-
ment of levels of theoretical discourse,” which he names after
systems best-representing each level: “Thermostat”, “Cell”,
“Plant”, “Animal”, “Human Being”, and others.
As already mentioned, the accent in Boulding is not only
behavioral; this makes it possible to highlight in particular
aspects such as the openness of the system [7]; its ability to
be not just aware but also self-aware; as well as the ability to
enact collective forms of behaviors.
An important addition in Boulding’s system with respect
to Wiener’s is given by the new class of “social organization”,
namely systems composed by “a set of roles tied together with
channels of communication”. The new class corresponds to
social behavior, which may in fact be the subject of a classiﬁca-
tion of its own2. Rather than a separate class, social behaviors
may be interpreted as an attribute of the behavioral classes
of [3] and in fact could be used as a second “coordinate” for
a general classiﬁcation of behaviors.
Boulding also introduces a ﬁnal class, consisting of hypo-
thetical systems whose organization and behaviors are beyond
those of the class of Human Beings. Such “Transcendental
systems” are useful for a discussion of the quality of systems
as they represent a reference point as exempliﬁed, e.g., in [8].
A. Conclusions
As mentioned already, Boulding’s gestalt incorporates and
extends Wiener’s, thus several of the considerations we stated
in Sect. II-A apply here too. An important additional research
direction naturally stemming from the Boulding system is the
dense contemporary “corpus” of research that focuses on social
organizations, social systems, and social behaviors, including
human and machine ecological aspects.
IV. SUBSTANCE
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question.
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.
The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock
T.S. ELIOT
A different and more direct approach is the one proposed
by Leibniz and anticipated, to a much lesser extent, by Aris-
totle and Pythagoras. In both Aristotle and Leibniz, the accent
is put also on behaviors but more so on the systems producing
them: the substance. Aristotle calls substance “a subject that
underwent change”, which is a deﬁnition surprisingly similar
to that of Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow. And Aristotle
2More information on this is available, for instance, through [10].too distinguishes passive and active-behaviored substances and
calls the latter as entelechies: substances that “bring about
their own changes from one state to another”. As recalled in
Sect. II, this is in fact the same initial step taken by Wiener
et al. when laying the foundation of their behavioral method.
Leibniz makes this concept and term their own and also refers
to his substance as entelechy, namely “a source of actions, or
rather, its own actions” [5]; but he introduces several novel
ideas3. So many and intertwined are those ideas4 that it is
rather difﬁcult to expose them in a satisfactory unitarian way.
In what follows we will not attempt such a titanic task but
rather will try to build a concise model of a subset of those
aspects that best match the themes of the present contribution.
A. Substances as Interconnected Networks
In Leibniz, substances are fully interconnected networks
of all-open, all-aware active-behaviored “nodes” (viz., ent-
elechies) whose behaviors depend deterministically on the
inﬂuence exercised by all other nodes. The term “inﬂuence”
refers here to a general Law, called by Leibniz the Principle
of Concomitance, that is “given” to all substances and that
all substances share. The Principle of Concomitance in turn is
based on the existence of some metric function measuring a
“distance” between any two substances. Leibniz calls such dis-
tance as “harmony”—which underlines again the link between
the System of Leibniz and the philosophy of Pythagoras [11].
Depending on the degree of harmony between substances,
substances may inﬂuence each other differently. When the
inﬂuence is very strong the involved substances are said to
“embody”. Embodiment means that a set of substances are so
much mutually inﬂuencing (so much “in harmony,” that is)
that they give raise to a new, social substance. The social
substance is represented by a controlling substance, which
Leibniz calls “Mind”. When substances are embodied the
mutual inﬂuence is so strong that, e.g., stimuli travel quickly
from one region of the network to the other, thus creating a
feeling of concomitance for perceived events and sensations—
such as the feeling of pain. To set this concept with the
language of modern technology we may think of a sensor
network whose nodes may directly interact only with the nodes
in wireless reach.
In Leibniz, bodies, minds, and perception—including the
perception of physical matter—are actually a product of the
above concomitance. The principle is valid for all substances
whatever their nature and “distance”—whatever their harmony
that is; but the exercised inﬂuence may vary and be felt
differently. As an example, the energy released by a star in
a far galaxy or a butterﬂy ﬂapping its wings a continent away
may be so “distant” from us as to exercise a minimal inﬂuence
on us—and in fact to go undetected at all. At the other
extreme of the “harmonic spectrum”, an offence experienced
by a vital organ would be immediately perceived by the social
substance—in particular, by the Mind—and have a profound
effect on the whole social substance5.
3This plurality of ideas is reﬂected in a plurality of terms to refer to
substances, that Leibniz calls minds, souls, entelechies, and monads depending
on the aspects he wanted to highlight.
4Strickland very eloquently refers to Leibniz’s as to a “piecemeal approach
to the diffusion of his ideas” [5].
5Obviously the Leibnitian concept of “harmonic distance” has little to do
with the familiar notion of geometrical distance.
We observe how the above deﬁnition extends considerably
that of Boulding’s social organizations that we recalled in
Sect. III, his concept of harmony among substances basically
corresponding to that of the communication channels in Bould-
ing. In fact Leibniz goes much beyond Boulding and even
appears to anticipate (of about three centuries!) several of the
ideas of social constructivism and in particular those of Actor-
Network Theory6 [12].
The harmony characterizing a substance is not an absolute
and eternal property; rather, it has a ﬁnite span after which
the network—the social substance—disintegrates into its con-
stituent substances: the substance “dies7”. Moreover, Leibniz
observes how the behaviors of a substance in close relation
with a second one may result in centrifugal forces that distort
or dissipate either or both of the substances’ “bodies8”.
B. Substances as All-aware, All-open Systems
As already mentioned, in Leibniz changes “ripple away”
from an originating substance (namely, from the active behav-
iors of an entelechy) and are perceived by all others, albeit with
different effects depending on their mutual “distance”. Being
a general law of all substances, the Principle of Concomitance
implies for Leibniz that all substances must be ready to encode
through some internal representation any of the possible events
occurring outside of them. Leibniz’s conclusions are that
substances must be embedded with a mechanism to represent
and instantly reﬂect all the possible states of all the substances
in the whole universe. This includes any change of state
due to “rippling”. Leibniz imagines also that this internal
representation-and-reﬂection (RR) mechanism constitutes the
only method of interaction between substances. Substances are
in fact “a world apart”, as he states. With the terminology of
computer science, we could say that Leibniz imagines that
substances run in separate “process spaces” and that their all-
awareness and their RR mechanism provide an indirect method
of interaction based on an internal representation of the ripples.
It is worth highlighting how the idea of an internal model,
or representation, of the external world, which of course is
very much inﬂuenced from Plato’s Cave, closely corresponds
to the modern concept of qualia as introduced, e.g., in [13]
and discussed in [8], [14]9.
In fact, Leibniz asserts, even the production of a new
qualia state produces a change; and that change also “ripples”,
as any other behavior, from the originating substance to all
6Also in Actor-Network Theory substances (called essences) are networks
of nodes. Those nodes have as many dimensions as they have “ties” (i.e.,
connections). Ties are “weak by themselves,” though they achieve robustness
(material resistance) through their social nature: “Each tie, no matter how
strong, is itself woven out of still weaker threads [..] Strength does not come
from concentration, purity and unity, but from dissemination, heterogeneity
and the careful plaiting of weak ties” [12]. The dissemination of ties provides
thus an interesting interpretation of Leibniz’s concept of harmony.
7Think again of the nodes of a sensor network deployed in unmanned
territory and running on batteries; if batteries discharge beyond the possibility
to transmit, the “social substance” collapses into a set of individual nodes.
8Crosstalk or adjacent-channel interference may be used to exemplify this
concept.
9In particular, from [14]: “sensors [..] reﬂect a given subset of the worlds
raw facts into internal representations that are then stored in some form within
the systems processing and control units—its “brains”. Qualia is the name used
in literature to refer to such representations.”others, leaving a footprint that is proportional to the mutual
harmony—the “metaphysical distance” between substances.
I like to refer to the overall effect of these reﬂections and
reactive behaviors as to a gigantic “metaphysical storm.”10
C. Substance as Conceptual Models
We said already that in Leibniz substance is a unicity.
He adds that substances are unicities that produce actions “in
accordance with their own individual concepts”. What makes
each and every substance unique and different from all others
is indeed the concept of that substance: its identity, which
makes it in-dividual, namely conceptually non-divisible. In
other words a substance is an entity whose concept is so
peculiar and so strong as to shift the attention from its parts
to an emerging unity—from the components to the composed.
“Man,” for instance, is a substance, because it is characterized
by a concept that is so complete and well-deﬁned that we
do not see the complex hierarchies of sub-systems a man
consists of; rather, we just see the product emerging from the
interactions—the social behaviors and systemic features we
could say—of those sub-systems. Once more we can highlight
here the strong link with the philosophy of Pythagoras [11].
Making use of an American vernacular we could say that
the substance of Man is what makes him thick. In fact, this
is precisely what Leibniz asserts: substances are the only
actual form of existence, while the so-called physical world
is nothing but a distorted perception due to a limited “power
of representation”—an argument that clearly reminds of Plato’s
Cave. The only reality is in fact that of substances, and
substances are conceptual models, namely system templates.
One such substance is, for instance, the algorithm of Bubble
Sort: a conceptual unity that results from a network of ancillary
substances in harmony with one another and emerging as
a univocally identiﬁed substance different from all possible
others. The quality of Bubble Sort is that, quoting Aristotle, it
is “more than the parts it is made of”. The network of ancillary
concepts that constitute Bubble Sort produces a peculiar added
value, a purposeful behavior that results in a method to sort
objects. Thus, Leibniz tells us, Bubble Sort is characterized
by “a certain demand for existence” [5]: it “deserves” to exist.
Of course other substances exist whose collective emerging
behavior results in a similar service. Quick Sort is indeed
another of such substances, and it is also characterized by
its own “claim to existence” [5]. Depending on the “systemic
quality” of similar substances, some of them are “conceived11”
by God, namely selected for existence, while some others are
discarded—for instance due either to limitations or to some
“natural” tendency towards elegance and conciseness. Another
reason for the selection of a substance is given by the fact
that “not all possible substances are compossible” [5], viz.
mutually compatible. Two examples of this compossibility
come to mind:
 An “Ultimate Predator” substance would prohibit the
existence of other “prey substances” and eventually
10For the Reader accustomed to the Twitter social system a way to represent
such “storm” would be that of considering a circle of users that consistently
re-tweets any message received by the members of the circle—including re-
tweet notiﬁcations!
11From Latin concipere, whose meanings include “to become pregnant”
[15].
result in its own demise—as can be inferred from
the Lotka-Volterra equations. Thus nature—or, for
Leibniz, God—prevents such a “compossibility” to
occur.
 The axioms in geometry E and the theorems that one
can demonstrate in it are compossible concepts in E,
but may well be that certain concepts that are “valid”
in E may contradict the concepts in another geometry
:E; thus they would be not compossible in :E.
Remarkably enough, we can observe once more how the
above concept of a “systemic quality” introduces a classiﬁca-
tion:
 Certain substances, such as Bubble Sort or Quick
Sort, exhibit no form of awareness. In other words,
they construct no model whatsoever of themselves
or their environment. They correspond to Wiener’s
servo-mechanisms and are only capable of purposeful
behaviors.
 Other substances, such as Cells and Plants, are char-
acterized by primitive and very limited forms of
awareness and “openness” [7]. They are only able to
construct a very limited model of their “world” and
strive towards basic teleological goals—for instance,
survival.
 Yet others, such as Animals, have primitive forms of
self-awareness. Their model of the physical reality
is more complex and translates in simple proactive
behaviors. A limited model of the “self” is also under
their grasp.
 Substance Man reaches an even greater ability to exert
complex behaviors and reach high degrees of self-
awareness and consciousness. Man in fact is even able
to reason about the nature of substances and construct
theories—such as Leibniz’s—about the working of the
ultimate “network of networks”—the universe.
As one can clearly realize, this results in a general systemic
classiﬁcation—a general systems theory—not dissimilar from
Boulding’s and Wiener’s. Substances are characterized by dif-
ferent “ﬁdelity”, which we deﬁned in [16] as “the compliance
between corresponding ﬁgures of interest in two separate but
communicating domains”. These two domains in Leibniz are
actually the Qualia world and the Physical world, the former
being the result of the RR mechanism introduced in IV-B while
the latter is the metaphysical reality—what Leibniz considered
to be “the Mind of God”. It is there that conceptual models are
conceived and it is from there that they are “set in motion.”
We observe how the above concept of substance as a model
is in fact very much intertwined with that of its uniqueness
and identity. Substance is a peculiar and well-deﬁned “logic”
that is different from all others—as in Aristotle’s concept of
deﬁnition. Aristotelian entelechy is in fact also the ability to
retain this identity12. As already mentioned, any substance,
e.g. Bubble Sort, is a concept that is itself and no other one—
a unique concept in other words, in that modifying it even
12Sachs [17] translates entelechy as “being-at-work” while “staying-the-
same”: “a source of actions, or rather its own actions” [5] that strives to retain
its identity—namely its peculiar conceptual foundations.Fig. 1. Preformationism exempliﬁed by Nicolaas Hartsoecker, 1695. Image
from the Wikimedia Commons.
slightly would turn it into something else—a variant. Leibniz
in fact asserts that any conceptual model may be expressed in
terms of a so-called Characteristica Universalis—a language
for the expression of logics, including predicates whose truth
value may require an evaluation (so-called contingent truths).
In what follows we shall use the expression “CU language” to
refer to the Characteristica Universalis.
As we already mentioned, compossibility and quality de-
termine a substance’s claim for existence. But the evaluation
of compossibility and especially quality calls for matching the
substance with external conditions—an environment. This con-
cept is strikingly in line with the methodological assumption
in our companion paper [6]:
“Our starting point here is the conjecture that [qual-
ity] is no absolute ﬁgure; rather, it is the result of a
match with a deployment environment.”
Remarkably enough, Leibniz introduces the same method-
ological assumption. A fair selection of a coherent set of
compossible substances requires a complete assessment of the
quality of its constituents; but the only way to achieve such
a complete assessment is by confronting the substances with
a vast amount of environmental conditions and checking their
individual and collective behaviors. The “open variables” in
the substances—corresponding to variables in CU language
“scripts”—are then grounded with respect to various contex-
tual conditions. This operation is called by Leibniz unpacking
and corresponds to solving a logic expression by assigning
“facts” (truth values) to its open variables until the expression
becomes either a tautology or a contradiction.
Substances are thus concepts, or better, “scripts,” expressed
in CU language13.
13In fact Leibniz considers substances as “second-order” scripts in that they
are the product of a ﬁrst-order script, similarly to the spermatic animalcules
theorized by Thonis van Leeuwenhoek. Leeuwenhoek, also known as the
Father of Microbiology, was the ﬁrst to observe spermatozoa and the grand
developer of preformationism, in turn derived from Pythagoras and Aristotle.
Preformationism states that all beings are the development of preformed
miniature-versions of the same beings—the above mentioned animalcules.
Figure 1 exempliﬁes preformationism showing a homunculus within a sper-
matozoon. Leibniz visited van Leeuwenhoek and was a convinced believer of
his theories, which he adopted in his own System.
The assessment is not just individual in that it is also
applied, “by construction” so to say, to the whole current
set of compossibles—namely, to the whole current ecosystem
of substances. As mentioned already, through the so-called
“rippling” assigned facts are propagated to all other substances
as in a sort of “universal gossiping” [18] among the nodes in
a sensor network. Compossibles are confronted and selected
also considering their entelechy, namely their ability to retain
their conceptual identity [17]—with the terminology of modern
computer science, their resilience [19].
Another criterion for the ecosystem-wide assessment is
given by the fact that the receptivity of the world is limited
and “God”, namely “a certain divine mathematics” [20], aims
“naturally” at making the best of the available resources. The
words of Leibniz are particularly remarkable:
“Of the inﬁnite combinations of possibilities and
possible series, the one that exists is the one through
which the most essence or possibility is brought
into existence. [...] Given the temporal and spatial
extent of the world—in short, its capacity or recep-
tivity—ﬁt into that as great a variety of kinds of
thing as possible.
[Said receptivity] can be considered as the expen-
diture or the land on which a building is to be
constructed as ﬁttingly as possible, while the variety
of forms correspond to the ﬁtness of the building and
to the number and elegance of its rooms. [...] And
the situation is like that in certain games where all
the spaces on the board are to be ﬁlled according to
certain rules, and where, unless you use some skill,
you will in the end be excluded from certain spaces
and forced to leave more spaces empty than you
could have or wished to” [5], [20]. [...] In short,
it is just like tiles arranged so as to get down as
many as possible in a given area.”
For this author it is remarkable how in such a relatively
limited passage Leibniz condenses so large a variety of con-
cepts and ideas whose signiﬁcance is particularly apparent
in our modern times. He discusses of limited receptivity—a
concept which reminds of the ideas expressed in the renowned
“Tragedy of the Commons” paper [21]; of system-environment
ﬁt—the cornerstone of our discussion in our companion pa-
per [6]; and his vision of the world as a board game leads
naturally to concepts such as cellular automata, virtual reality,
and artiﬁcial life. Moreover, his criterion of reaching as great a
variety as possible among substances matches remarkably well
the results discussed, e.g., in [10], [22], namely the key role
played by diversity and disparity in the survival of biological
(and digital [23]) ecosystems.
D. The Substance Scheduler
As mentioned already, Leibniz conjectures the existence of
a transcendental entity—a “God”. As in Boulding, said entity
represents the highest level in the gestalt hierarchy. But while
in Boulding this concept is left unexplored, in Leibniz it is
justiﬁed through a series of logic deduction that follow from
the very postulates of his system.
The very ﬁrst of such deductions is stated through the
following famous quote:All substances “subsist in the mind of God” [5].
The elements so far introduced allow us to attempt a daring
interpretation of the above sentence: the Leibnitian God is
yet another substance, namely a network of substances with
a central organization and a central “hub” that embodies (we
could say, “punctualizes” [12]) the whole network into a
unique and in-dividual concept (cf. Sect. IV-A). The Mind of
such network is God, and the matter emerging from its union
is the world.
Stated in other words, God is the largest possible network
of networks—the largest possible “scale” in a gigantic recur-
sive structure that spans an entire theory of concepts. One may
possibly visualize this through the image of an enormous mind-
map connecting, e.g., all the arithmetically derivable concepts,
and with a predeﬁned Center representing the whole system—
in this example, the concept of arithmetics. Furthermore, in
Leibniz it follows that God is the central controller of the
universe; a substance so perfect as to be in utmost harmony
with all the other substances whatever their scale (whatever
their level of recursive nesting, that is). The most perfect
substance thus; but a substance nevertheless, hence a concept
(cf. Sect. IV-C), hence the executor of a “function”. To Leibniz
this function can only be Ultimate Sort: a “procedure” for
the optimal scheduling-for-existence of the available concepts.
Thus God is an ordinateur, or an operating system if you
want, who manages a limited process space and selects process
images to be deployed and executed onto the Bare Machine. A
task, says Leibniz, not dissimilar to that of a player of a board
game in which the goal is being able to “maximize the returns”,
namely the overall quality, by choosing the best and allocating
the most compossible substances to have “on board”. God is
therefore a sorting algorithm and his data structures are the
substances and the world—in particular its intrinsic limitations
and current state. Ultimate Sort is written in CU language and
is to be executed on a compliant machine—Leibniz makes use
of the expression “Calculus Ratiocinator” for this CU language
interpreter.
So logic and coherent is the discussion that by considering
the major elements of the Leibnitian system that are brieﬂy
summarized in this section it is possible to formulate a pseudo-
code for Ultimate Sort as stated in Table I.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Whatever happens in a piece of music is nothing but the
endless reshaping of a basic shape. Or, in other words,
there is nothing in a piece of music but what comes
from the theme, springs from it and can be traced back
to it; to put it still more severely, nothing but the theme
itself. Or, all the shapes appearing in a piece of music
are foreseen in the “theme.”
ARNOLD SCHOENBERG [25]
We have described three general systems theories by fo-
cusing on their conceptual cornerstones—their gestalts. As
anticipated by Boulding, each gestalt helps discuss a peculiar
aspect of a family of systems and “directs research towards the
gaps that it reveals”. Particular attention has been devoted to
substance, the gestalt at the core of the Leibnitian treatise. We
have highlighted how several key ideas of modern science may
Procedure USort (S, W)
/* S is the set of all substances*/
/* W is a variable reﬂecting [24] the state of the current world */
begin
01 Parallel Do
02 At Individual Level
03 For All s 2 S Do
/* IntrinsicQuality returns the static component of substance quality */
/* This may include, e.g., the behavioral class of s (cf. Sect. II), */
/* or the Boulding level of s (cf. Sect. III), */
/* or other architectural/organizational/behavioral characteristics. */
04 i   IntrinsicQuality(s);
/* ExtrinsicQuality returns the dynamic component of substance quality */
/* It calls Unpack(s, W) to execute s with environmental conditions as in W. */
/* Variables of s requiring the truth value of contingent truths are thus resolved. */
05 e   ExtrinsicQuality(s, W);
/* IndividualQuality returns a substance’s overall quality */
/* this corresponds to the concept of system-environment ﬁt */
/* as deﬁned in the companion paper [6]. */
06 s:q   IndividualQuality(i;e);
07 End For
08 End Level
09 At Social Level
/* If W allows another substance to be deployed...*/
10 if Receptivity(W) > 0 then
/* ...a compossible substance of highest individual quality is selected...*/
11 s   SelectForExistence(S);
/* ...and deployed in W: */
12 Deploy(s);
13 else
/* If W has reached its limits then we need to make room. */
/* We select the substance that has the “worst-quality” with respect to */
/* IndividualQuality and world-speciﬁc criteria (minimal loss of */
/* diversity and disparity [10], [23], maximal “cost” in terms */
/* of world space requirements, etc.) */
14 s   SelectForDestruction(S);
/* The minimum-quality existing substance is purged. */
15 Undeploy(s);
16 end if
17 End Level
18 End Do
end.
TABLE I. PSEUDO-CODE OF LEIBNIZ’S ULTIMATE SORT.
locate their foundation in the system of Leibniz—including,
e.g., virtual reality, artiﬁcial life, genetic programming, auto-
nomic computing, cyber-physical things, and cyber-physical
societies. In this conclusions we like to highlight in particular
two of our own recent research directions:
1) The work presented in the companion paper [6]. In
that work we introduce an intrinsic quality parameter
given by the behavioral class of the system under
scrutiny. This corresponds to Statement 04 in Table I,
in which the substance scheduler evaluates the intrin-
sic quality of a substance. We also deﬁne a system-
environment ﬁt—which corresponds to evaluating a
substance’s extrinsic quality, or the quality under
speciﬁc external conditions. This is the same as in
Statement 05 in Table I: a behavioral implementation
of function “ExtrinsicQuality” may be in fact that
exempliﬁed in Fig. 2 of the companion paper.
2) The work presented in paper [26] and anticipated
by the mathematical models of the HeartQuake
game [27] and Permutation Numbers [28]. In those
works we consider the “movements” produced by
deterministic game procedures; by the permutations
of a ﬁxed “population” of digits; and by the non-
deterministic arrangements of actants that respondto the onset of environmental conditions—such as
crises. The graphs representing the collection of
all possible arrangements are indeed networks of
“concepts” embedding other concepts into recursive
structures that, through some divine mathematics,
result in self-similar “matryoshka doll” graphs such
as the one exempliﬁed in Fig. 2. The modular
structure in that picture is in fact the expansion of
string “001123344”—the 5-ary representation of a
substance if you want. As that string includes in
itself a number of substrings, likewise its expansion
includes the expansions of its substrings, with a
conservation of modularity that reminds of the results
in [29]. This provides a geometrical interpretation
of Leibniz’s vision of the monads as networks of
substances emerging and “descending” from a central
concept—what Schoenberg would probably refer to
as a “theme” [25] a whole composition springs from
and may be traced back to. An exemple of this princi-
ple is given by musical compositions such as Ostinato
011112333 [30]—a musical rendition of the very
same “divine mathematics” presented in Fig. 2 but
this time referring to substance “011112333”. Every
single note expressed in the mentioned composition
derives in fact deterministically from the its “theme”,
string 011112333.
As a ﬁnal remark we would like to draw once more
the attention of the reader to van Leeuwenhoek and his
theory of preformationism—a theory that was enthusiastically
accepted by Leibniz and never doubted in the course of his
whole life [5]. We conjecture that the main reason for this
may be that, though obviously an incorrect and unscientiﬁc
concept, preformationism contains in nuce a quite modern
and “scientiﬁcally discussed” concept, namely the already
mentioned principle of conservation of modularity, namely
the property of conserving modularization when passing from
a genotypical representation (viz. a concept, or abstract and
general template) to a phenotypical representation (namely a
particular “realization”, or concrete expansion, of the tem-
plate) [29]. This property, which may be probably best rep-
resented through the mathematical concept of an isomorphism
between a genotypical and a phenotypical algebraic domain, is
in fact compatible with the Leibnitian vision of substances as
“second-order scripts” produced by “ﬁrst-order scripts”. This
conservation of modularity probably hints at the reasons why
evolution “evolves” and nature “naturally” develops ever more
complex substances.
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